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AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ACCOUNTANTS

Memorandum from Mr. Carey

January 17, 1955

To Committee on Relations
with Bar

Subject:

Comment on Dean Griswold’s New York Speech

At the meeting of the Institute’s committee on relations

with bar and the American Bar Association representatives at
Washington, January 25th and 26th, references are likely to be

made to the speech delivered by Erwin N. Griswold, Dean of the
Harvard Law School, at the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York, January 13, 1955.

Dean Griswold’s speech raises certain questions as to
the validity of the Institute’s position and some of its proposals

with regard to the field of tax practice, and Dean Griswold also

makes certain suggestions looking to a solution of the problem.
It seems to me that it might be helpful to your committee,
therefore, in this memorandum, to try to match up his comment with
the reasoning underlying the Institute’s position and its recent

action in order that the underlying issues may be clear and not
obscured by any misunderstanding.

If this memorandum is to be in your hands in time to be
of much use in preparation for the coming meeting with the Bar repre
sentatives, there is not time to clear it in advance with our
counsel or with the special committee on tax practice.

Therefore,
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the memorandum must be offered to you as a personal expression of

my own understanding of these matters.

Copies are being sent to

our counsel and to the president of the Institute so that they
may correct me if they think I am in error in any respect.
In order to make this memorandum as brief and as usable

as possible, I shall condense the main points in Dean Griswold’s
paper into as few words as possible and state them underlined in

the form of topical heading with page and paragraph references to

the copy of the address which has already been sent to you.

It is

suggested, therefore, that you reread the address in conjunction
with this memorandum.

Statutes in many states give lawyers the exclusive
right to "practice law".

clear.

The limits of that term are not wholly

(Page 2, first incomplete paragraph)

This is the root of the entire difficulty.

Is it not

time that the legal profession provided a general definition of
the types of work to which lawyers are given an exclusive right?
Such definitions are provided in England.

The need for them has

become greater, since every phase of economic activity has become
subject to regulation or supervision by government agencies.

Certified public accountants and other non-lawyers have no guide
to proper conduct in dealing with the various agencies on behalf

of their clients as long as the Bar Association Insists that the
"practice of law" is whatever the state courts say it is.

In most states there is no control at all over public
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accountants, tax experts, and so on.

Any who wants can set him

self up as a tax expert even if he has been stricken from the
rolls of the certified public accountants.

(Page

first full

paragraph.)

There is no particular reason why the organized

accounting profession should be charged with the discredit of un
qualified tax consultants.

The fact is that the field of prepara

tion of Federal Income tax returns has not been established as a
field of either law or public accounting, nor has it been pre

empted by the Federal government.

One of the objectives of the

Institute in supporting the Reed Bill is to clarify the authority
of the Treasury Department to preempt the field of preparing tax

returns and to set up standards for persons who may be permitted
to do so.

We can see no other solution of the problem.

If

preparation of tax returns were to be held to be the practice of
law, then certified public accountants could not do it.

Yet law

yers. generally do not claim competence in the preparation of tax
returns, nor do they wish to do this work.
A serious obstacle in the way of proper recognition for

certified public accountants may be the fact that the certified

public accountants seem to have deliberately chosen to take all of
the other accountants and practitioners under their wing. (Top of
page 4.)
The Institute has not taken all accountants under its
wing, or undertaken to speak for them.

The brief we filed in the

Conway case in Minnesota, where a non-certified tax consultant
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was involved, made it crystal clear that we were not appearing on
behalf of the respondent, but were appearing only to ask the court

to hand down its ruling in terms that would not make it illegal

for certified public accountants, enrolled to practice before the
Treasury Department, to continue their customary work.

In the Statement of Principles, the Institute speaks
only for certified public accountants.

In the Bercu and Agran cases, certified public account

ants were attacked by unauthorized practice committees of local

bar associations.

The unauthorized practice committees did not

appear to distinguish between CPAs and non-certified accountants.

It is obvious that the separation of functions between
lawyers and qualified accountants in this area is an extremely

difficult matter.

(Bottom

page 5 and top of page 6).

This paragraph is of major importance.

It seems to say

that once a CPA is admitted into the area of tax practice (no doubt
it is assumed that this is short of litigation or formal adversary

proceedings) there is no way of defining the line at which he

must stop and call in a lawyer.

Inside the circle, the CPA must

be permitted to do whatever necessary in the light of the particular

circumstances, but with the general understanding that he will
voluntarily call in a lawyer when the circumstances of the case,
or the limits of the CPA’s competence, may make it desirable to
do so.

It must be assumed that the determination of when to call

in a lawyer must be subjective and must be left to the voluntary
action of the CPA.
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Accountants and others who are not professionally quali

fied, however, might not be permitted into this "inner circle”,
although they might be permitted to do some things in the tax
field, such as the preparation of tax returns.

For the sake of convenience, this idea will be referred to
later in this memorandum as "the inner circle theory".
An important point is that it must be assumed that CPAs

admitted to the ’’inner circle" would be permitted to interpret and
apply the Internal Revenue Code in the determination of taxable

income and the settlement of tax liabilities.

Dean Griswold does

not say this specifically in the paper, but the paragraph under

discussion would make no sense if this assumption were not valid.

As a matter of fact, in answer to a question after the
speech at the Bar Association, Dean Griswold made it clear in
terms that a certified public accountant might properly interpret
and apply the tax statutes in the determination of taxable Income.

It may not be wise for an accountant to sue for fees for
tax work. (Top of page 7)

This point is made several times in the speech.

While

it may be desirable to avoid these suits for the brief period

during which this problem is being worked out, it does not seem

that there is any lasting solution merely in the avoidance of liti
gation.

There is evidence that lawyers are more and more frequently

encouraging clients not to pay the accountants for tax services

rendered in good faith.

Certified public accountants, as members of

a recognized profession, do not wish to practice under the shadow
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of illegality, even though they might work out techniques for
being paid without the risk of litigation.

Reputable professional

men do not like to be in the position of "bootlegging" professional
services.

Conway, who was neither a lawyer nor a certified public
accountant, prepared tax returns involving substantial questions

of law.

wrong.

It is not surprising that the court held him to be in the
Had he been a certified public accountant, the result might

have been different.

It is unfortunate that the Institute chose to

support this unqualified practitioner.

(Page 7, first full paragraph)

As pointed but above, the Institute did not support this
unqualified practitioner.

The brief asks only that the court’s

opinion make a distinction between certified public accountants and

unqualified practitioners - which incidentally it failed to do.

This summary does not point out that the action was insti
gated by Ramsey County Bar Association, which framed the questions

on which Conway was asked for an opinion.

The questions included

matters of general law and matters involving Interpretation of the
Internal Revenue Code and related regulations.

In holding that the respondent was "practicing law" when

he dealt with "difficult and doubtful" questions of law, the court
did not distinguish general law and interpretation of the Internal

Revenue Code.
Technically, therefore, the decision might be held to apply

to certified public accountants of Minnesota in Interpreting the

Internal Revenue Code alone, apart from any questions of general
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law.

This is exactly what the Institute attempted to prevent, but

failed.
The Minnesota Supreme Court in the Conway case rejected
the "incidental" test established by the New York Court of Appeal

in the Bercu case.

Certified public accountants generally had felt

that they could live with the Bercu decision and continue their
practice under its limitations.

They were alarmed by the Conway

decision since it had been instigated by a bar association.

They

feared that it represented a deliberate effort by the organized

bar to build up a body of case law that ultimately would exclude
all non-lawyers from all phases of tax practice.

The American Institute of Accountants filed a brief in
the Agran case.

(Bottom of page 7)

This in an error.
Agran case.

The Institute did not appear in the

In the trial court, Agran had been allowed the full

amount of his fee $2,000.

On appeal, the representative of the

California State Bar intervened as friend of the court.

He con

tended that Agran had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law

and should not be paid his fee.

Thereupon, the California Society

of Certified Public Accountants, alarmed and resentful at the

intervention of the California State Bar, filed a brief as friend
of the court, contending that as a CPA enrolled to practice before

the Treasury, Agran was entitled to render the service he did
render and should be paid therefor.

Since Agran testified that he had spent five days in
the County Law Library reading tax services, cases, reports and
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decisions, and reviewed over 100 cases on the proposition of law
Involved, it should not be unduly surprising that the court held

that he had been practicing law.

(Page 8, first paragraph)

This point is stressed more than once later in the speech.
It is also stressed in the decision of the court in the Agran case.

It raises the Interesting question whether the fact that Agran
acted and talked like a lawyer in contending for his fee might be

of greater importance in the eyes of judges and of other lawyers
than what he actually did in rendering the tax services under

consideration.
CPAs have assumed that it didn’t matter how Agran talked

and acted: that what was of importance, was what he really did.

He

could have spent much less time reading the tax services in his
own office, or in the office of the American Institute of Accountants

and it would not have altered in any way the nature of the service
that he rendered.

What Agran actually did after making out the tax return

was to settle informally with the Internal Revenue Service a
difference affecting the tax liability of his regular client.

The

difference arose from a transaction ending in a loss which could

be argued to be a capital loss, or could be argued to be an opera

ting loss.

Agran argued that it was an operating loss, therefore

chargeable against Income which resulted in loss carry back to an
earlier year.

He won his point, and the case was settled on this

basis.
In arguing his point, Agran naturally had to consult and

interpret the Internal Revenue Code and related regulations, rulings
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and decisions to ascertain the probability that the Internal Revenue
Service would accept his contentions.

In holding that he had engaged in the unauthorized prac

tice of law, the California court made two points:

one point

that was stressed was the point Dean Griswold stresses:
spent time in the law library and read many cases.

that Agran

The second point,

however, that the court made was that Agran had interpreted and

applied the provisions of the statute.
The court cited a definition of the practice of law in

support of its holding and, within this definition presumably, the
court thought both of Agran’s actions fell - reading law and
decisions, and interpreting the provisions of the statute.

It is obvious that CPAs cannot practice in the tax field

if they cannot interpret and apply the provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code and related regulations and decisions.

If the Agran

decision were allowed to stand as a precedent, therefore, it seemed

to CPAs that they were in danger of being excluded from tax practice.

Incidentally, it is of interest that the subject of
operating loss carry back is categorized among a list of accounting

subjects by the Minnesota Supreme Court in the Conway decision,
where an effort was made to illustrate what the court thought were

matters of accounting as opposed to matters of law.

The California

court in the Agran case relied on the Conway decision in large part
in developing its theory, but ignored the fact that the item it had

been dealing with had been characterized in that very Conway decision
as a matter of accounting.
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The "Statement of Principles Relating to Practice in the

Field of Federal Income Taxation" is hopeful, worthwhile, states

manlike.

It should not get lost in the current shuffle. (Page 8,

second paragraph and last paragraph, and top of page 9)
The Institute was proud of the "Statement of Principles"

and its members were happy when it was adopted.

It seemed to offer

peace between the legal and accounting professions.
It was a shock to find the "Statement of Principles"

cited against a certified public accountant by a representative
of a bar association in the Agran case and to find the court in

the Agran case applying meanings to the Statement which the Insti
tute did not believe had been intended.
First, the Institute had thought that the Statement was

a declaration of cooperation, designed to encourage voluntary
action, not a contract to be construed in court.

Second, in

deliberately avoiding any effort to define the terms "law" and

"accounting", as used in the Statement, the Institute thought it
had been understood that accounting included accounting in accord

ance with the tax law.

If it did not, the Statement became mean

ingless.
But here was a court citing this very Statement and

holding that a certified public accountant had engaged in the un

authorized practice of law in deciding and arguing what he believed

to be proper accounting in accordance with the requirements of the
tax law.
It was also a shock to find a committee of the American

Bar Association quoting from the Statement of Principles in a

11

statement opposing the Institute’s request for relief through

modification of the Treasury regulations, and, in its conclusion,
accusing the Institute of attempting to ’’overthrow” the Statement

of Principles to which it had subscribed only a few years ago.
The Institute has felt obliged to prepare an interpre

tation of the Statement of Principles which it is expected will
be published shortly, so that its own understanding of what the
Statement was intended to mean will be a matter of record.

Though the Rocky Mountain Law Review article by Carey

first seemed Inflammatory, it was reread in connection with

preparation for the present speech, and ”I do not find much in it
now that disturbs me.

It is a dispassionate, well-tempered dis

cussion of the problem from the accountant’s point of view, with

clear references to the Statement of Principles of the National
Conference of Lawyers and Certified Public Accountants”.

(Page 9,

first full paragraph)
This may be a statement of major significance.

The

Rocky Mountain Law Review article contended that the interpretation

of statutes,

regulations or court decisions was not ipso facto the

practice of law;

that the field of Federal income tax practice was

not exclusively within the field of law;

that the certified public

accountants’ position in the field of tax practice was a natural and
proper one, developing from their competence to deal with tax
accounting problems, not as a result of a default of the lawyers;
that accounting Involved application of a large body of theories,

principles, the exercise of judgment and delicate distinctions - in
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other words, it is not merely a mechanical process;

that neither

all lawyers nor all accountants are necessarily competent in
taxation; that the solution to the accountant-lawyer controversy
was voluntary cooperation in tax practice.

If Dean Griswold accepts these propositions, he should
provide powerful support for settlement of the difficulties
acceptable to the Institute.

It may be that it is the position of the accountants
that there is nothing at all in the tax field that they cannot
properly undertake, short of appearing in a regular court. (Page
9, last incomplete paragraph)

The Statement of Principles makes it clear that the
Institute does not take this position and the Institute has not

repudiated the Statement.

If it is agreed that the lawyers should be brought in
when legal knowledge, or a lawyer's viewpoint, would be helpful to
the client, some people might think that a lawyer should have been

brought in, in conjunction with the problem which Involved "reading
a hundred cases in four or five days' study in office and county law

library".

(Page 10, first incomplete paragraph)

As pointed out above, in discussion of the Agran case,

CPAs have felt that the subject matter of the problem Agran dealt
with was accounting subject matter, and that it made little dif
ference where he read it, or how long it took.

The Agran case seems to have frightened accountants un

duly.

It is just another case decided by a minor court, effective
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only in a limited jurisdiction.

accountants.

The facts were not strong for

Lawyers are inclined to wonder why accountants are

so excited about the Agran case. (Page 10, first full paragraph)

This is a very Important question.
The Institute was exercised about the Agran case first
because it was the most recent in a chain of cases which seemed to
be building up a body of judge-made law, the logic of which would

lead Inexorably to the conclusion that CPAs had no place in tax

practice, except conceivably in the preparation of returns not
Involving difficult or complex questions.

Even before Bercu, in the Loeb case in Massachusetts, a
bar association had contended that the preparation of income tax

returns was the practice of law.

Only a year ago, the Rhode Island

Bar Association made the same contention before the Supreme Court
of Rhode Island in the Libutti case, but was not sustained.

The philosophy set forth by the New York Court of Appeals

in the Bercu case represented a compromise which certified public
accountants thought they could live with.

It permitted them to

make out tax returns, give tax advice to regular clients and to do

all things which the Treasury regulations permitted them to do if

they were enrolled agents.

But the Conway case rejected that

philosophy and substituted a vaguer test - that only a lawyer

could deal with "difficult and doubtful" questions of law pre

sumably whether general law or tax law.
culty and doubtfulness was very vague.

The standard

of diffi

The Agran case also

rejected the Bercu philosophy and followed the Conway reasoning.

More Important, the Agran decision was the first case to be
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decided against a certified public accountant, enrolled to

practice before the Treasury.

If this case were allowed to stand

as a precedent, it appeared that state courts might limit or even
nullify the non-lawyer’s right to practice before the Treasury

Department.

If all these cases had been isolated and accidental,
certified public accountants might not have been so much concerned.

What concerned them most was the attitude in the statements issued
by the Bar Associations. In their briefs in the Loeb, Bercu, Conway
and Libutti cases, bar associations had taken a very stringent view

of what non-lawyers might be permitted to do in the tax field.
In addition, committees of the California and Florida Bar Associa
tions issued statements indicating that certified public account

ants should yield to lawyers in tax cases where a thirty-day
letter had been issued and that generally accountants should

confine themselves to the arithmetical phases of tax computations.

Threatening statements were being made by spokesmen of the bar
associations of Texas, Tennessee and other states.

The Unauthorized Practice News, published by the American
Bar Association, continually published references, referring to the

unauthorized practice of law by accountants in the tax field, which
seemed likely to encourage action by local bar associations against

certified public accountants.

The American Bar Association was

backing a new form of administrative practitioners' bill which

would have limited the activities of non-lawyers in practice before
Federal agencies.

The American Bar Association’s representatives
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on the National Conference of Lawyers and Certified Public Account
ants were pressing the accountants to agree to statements further

limiting accountants’ activities in the field of giving tax advice.

It seemed to the Institute that the organized bar was
conducting a calculated campaign to drive the accounting profession

far back of its present position in the tax practice field.

When

the Agran decision came, involving a CPA enrolled to practice before

the Treasury Department, it appeared that unless the matter was

brought to the attention of the public and the Federal government,
all might be lost in the near future.
In seeking to have Treasury Circular 230 amended, the

Institute may have thought the time was propitious, in view of the
fact that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue was a CPA and former
president of the Institute. (Page 10, last incomplete paragraph)

Actually, the Institute had sought amendment of Circular
230 before the Agran case, because the proviso of Section 10.2(f)
was being cited as Justification for a client’s refusal to pay

fees of members of the Institute for tax services.

It did not

believe that the Treasury intended the proviso to be used to pre

vent its agents from getting paid for work which the Treasury was
permitting them to do.

The Agran decision confirmed the Institute’s

worst fears in this regard.
The attempt to have the Treasury’s regulations clarified
would have been made undoubtedly regardless of who was Commissioner

of Internal Revenue.

It is not the Commissioner’s regulation in

any event, but the Secretary of the Treasury’s and, as it happens,
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the Secretary is a lawyer.

The Institute introduced a bill in Congress which provides
that "no person shall be denied the right to engage" in settlement

of Federal tax liabilities"solely because he is not a member of any
particular profession or calling."

(Page 11, first incomplete para

graph)

The Reed bill, supported by the Institute, provided that
the Secretary of the Treasury may set the standards, as he now does,

for

persons engaging in settlement of tax liabilities with the

Internal Revenue Service.

In addition, the bill would clarify his

authority to set standards for persons who prepare tax returns.

When the Institute decided that the time had come to
take a stand, it also decided to exhaust all possible remedies,

to have the Supreme Court review the Agran decision if possible,
to have the Treasury amend or clarify its regulations, and to have
the Congress make a clear declaration of policy with regard to
Federal tax practice.

Note that neither of these proposed changes is limited

in its scope to certified public accountants, but they would be
applicable to all persons who wanted to act as accountants or tax
consultants regardless of training or professional standing.

(Page

11, first incomplete paragraph)

Practice before the Treasury Department is not now limited

to lawyers and certified public accountants.

Former Internal

Revenue Agents, public accountants and others may be enrolled to
practice after passing an examination set by the Treasury Depart

ment, which is fairly difficult, indeed, embodying some parts of
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the Uniform CPA Examination.
The Reed Bill contemplates that that situation will be

continued, but it would guard against the possibility that the
Secretary of the Treasury might make a rule permitting only law

yers to practice before his department.

In other words, as things stand now, any one at all can

prepare Federal tax returns and any one whom the Treasury chooses

to enrol can settle tax liabilities with the Internal Revenue '
Service.
The Reed Bill would not change the present situation at

all, but it would give the Treasury clear authority to regulate
the preparation of returns if it wanted to.
"Helping the Taxpayer" is "slick", is not a fair presenta
tion of the problem, indicates that there is some threat to the right
of accountants to make out tax returns, and makes no reference to

the Statement of Principles.

(Page 11, first full paragraph)

"Helping the Taxpayer" went through about fifteen drafts,
was reviewed
by tax experts, and legal counsel.

It is believed to be

a precisely accurate statement of what it purports to state.

It was intended to be as simple and direct as possible;
the statement of the problem raised by the Agran case; the need for

amendment of the Treasury regulations; and Federal legislation to

solve that problem.

The pamphlet was not intended to be an overall discussion
of relations between the accounting and legal professions, but was

pointed to one specific problem.

It was addressed to laymen.
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There is some threat to the right of accountants to make
out tax returns.

As noted above, bar associations in Massachusetts

and Rhode Island have contended that the preparation of Federal income

tax returns constitutes the practice of law.

In the Agran case, it

was noted that accountants may make out tax returns, except where

substantial questions of law are involved, and this exception is

echoed in the statement of the American Bar Association committee to
the Treasury Department on Circular 230.

There seemed no particular reason why the pamphlet should

refer to the Statement of Principles.

It is believed that there is

nothing in it which is inconsistent with the Statement of Principles.

The American Institute of Accountants has twice sent

members letters asking them to write their Congressmen and Senators
and talk with their clients in support of the Reed Bill.

It is

hard to suppress the feeling that the Institute is seeking to free
its members and all other accountants from all restraint in tax

practice and that it has repudiated the Statement of Principles.
(Page 11, second complete paragraph)

There is nothing in what the Institute has done that
seems inconsistent with the Statement of Principles and the Institute
has not repudiated that Statement.

It is, however, preparing to

publish its own interpretation of what the statement means, which is

different from the interpretation given in the Agran case.
The Institute believes that unless the Federal government

will preempt the field of Federal income tax practice, it will

become chaos.

It seems inevitable that if the courts of the 48
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states, by a slow and painful process of evolving common law, have

to deal with all aspects of Federal income tax practice, the

results are bound to be inconsistent and confusing for many years
to come.

If the Federal government has power to levy a tax on
income and to administer the law which levies that tax, it seems

only common sense to assume that as part of that administration it
may determine who, and under what conditions, may help taxpayers to
report their Income and settle their tax liabilities.
When the words of the Statement of Principles are laid

alongside the actual facts of the Agran case, it suggests that the
Agran case was a poor case for the accountants.

(Page 11, last

complete paragraph.)

It is difficult to reconcile this statement with Dean
Griswold’s "inner circle" theory set forth on pages 5 and

the speech.

6

of

Agran had all the qualifications an accountant can

have to engage in tax practice.

What he did was settle a regular

client’s tax liabilities in an informal proceeding with the
Internal Revenue Service.

do this.

The Statement of Principles says he can

Dean Griswold recognizes that if certified public ac

countants are to be let into the field at all, there can be no
sharp dividing line marking the boundaries of what they can do.
To strike out the proviso of Section 10.2(f) of Circular
230 isthe equivalent of saying that non-lawyers may practice law.

(Page 12, first Incomplete paragraph)
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It is difficult to see why this would be so.

The Treasury has the right to decide who can help tax
payers settle their Federal income tax liabilities.

In its rules

it says that lawyers and certified public accountants, and others

under certain conditions, may help taxpayers, and once being
enrolled to do so, they may "deal with all matters" involved in

the presentation of a client's Interests to the Department.

There is no authoritative definition which says that
the things enrolled agents do, in accordance with Treasury per
mission, constitutes any part of the practice of law.
It seems Inconceivable that the Treasury could have

intended under the proviso of Section 10.2(f) to invite the

state courts to place undefined limitations on the extent to
which its enrolled agents could proceed to do what the Treasury
had clearly authorized them to do - deal with all matters in

volved in the presentation of a client's interests to the Depart

ment.
Might it not be a better approach to have a further
proviso added to the effect that nothing in the regulations would

prohibit a CPA from practicing certified public accounting. (Page

12, first incomplete paragraph)
It is difficult to see how this would help.

What would

its effect have been in the Agran case?

It is interesting to speculate, however, what would be

the effect of a parallel proviso to Section 10.2(f) to the effect
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that “nothing in the regulations in this part shall be construed
as authorizing anyone not a certified public accountant or a

licensed public accountant to practice public accounting.

It

happens that the regulatory public accounting law in California does

prohibit anyone not a CPA or a licensed public accountant from filing

financial reports with government agencies.

This would appear to

make it impossible for anyone except CPAs and licensed CAs to pre

pare or file Federal income tax returns.

Any suggestions that the accountants might try to keep
the lawyers from practicing accounting in the tax field, while the

lawyers try to keep the accountants from practicing law in the tax

field, all through the medium of the state legislatures and the

state courts, certainly seem to point to the desirability of

preemption of this entire field by the Federal government.
Lawyers will oppose an attempt to centralize authority
for regulation of tax practice in the Federal government.

(Page

12, first complete paragraph)
The Institute expected the opposition of the legal

profession.

It saw no alternative to Federal regulation of tax

practice, except chaos and the eventual elimination of accountants
from the field.
decide the issue.

It was perfectly willing to let public opinion
It is the public who pays the bill.

A Federal statute might not accomplish what the account
ants want.

The courts might not support it.

(Page 12, last com

plete paragraph)

Counsel for the Institute advises that if the Congress
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preempted the field of Federal tax practice, state courts could

not interfere successfully with enrolled agents.

Counsel is

preparing an exhaustive brief on this subject which will probably
be available within a month.

The accountants should pick a better case than the Agran
case the next time they appear in court.

(Page 13, second complete

paragraph)
The accountants can not pick cases.

The American Insti

tute has never initiated a case in this subject.

The cases are

initiated and therefore selected by the bar associations.

accountants must always be on the defensive

The

and it may be expected

that the cases will not be favorable from the accountants point of
view.

There should be a complete moratorium for a year or even
more. (Page 13, second complete paragraph)
The Institute would undoubtedly welcome a moratorium of

indefinite length if it could be assured that its members could
collect their fees for the tax services they render and that local

bar associations would not initiate tentative action against
certified public accountants or others, involving situations in
which the decisions could adversely affect certified public account
ants .

The Institute should speak only for CPAs and differentiate

itself from other practitioners of accounting.

(Page 13, third

complete paragraph)
The Institute does speak only for CPAs and does differ

entiate between CPAs and other practitioners.
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It does not, however, wish to appear before the public

in the position of trying to exclude from tax practice all non
certified accountants who are presently in the field.

The Insti

tute does not believe that the field of Federal income tax prac

tice in all its phases can be successfully regulated under state
law, or that persons other than certified public accountants or

lawyers who now work in this field can be expelled from it.
The only solution would seem to be overall regulation

of all phases of tax practice by the Treasury Department which
would require demonstration of such professional qualifications

as it felt necessary.

An agreement has already been reached between the two
professions in the Statement of Principles and we should return
to that.

(Page 14, first incomplete paragraph)

The Statement has not been repudiated.

It provides no

protection for CPAs against attack by local bar associations.

Both the Bercu and Agran cases were cases where account
ants started the proceedings in court.

The Institute might advise

against fee suits except in cases where the grounds were clear.
(Page 14, first full paragraph)

Actually, the Bercu and Agran decisions were the result
of intervention by the New York County Lawyers Association and the

California State Bar respectively.

The lower court in the Bercu case

had denied the CPA his fee, and in the Agran case, had awarded it to
him.

There would have been no trouble, if the bar associations had

stayed out.

- 24 -

Incidentally, it has always been a source of regret
to the accounting profession that counsel for the New York County
Lawyers Association in the Bercu case was a member of the National
Conference of Lawyers and Certified Public Accountants representing
the American Bar Association.

Solution of the problem through the National Conference

machinery was attempted with great labor and good will.

It broke

down because local bar associations attacked certified public
accountants in spite of existing machinery for peaceful settlement

of differences.

In other common law countries, this problem does not
exist.

(Page 14, fourth complete paragraph)

It is significant that in England, in Canada and in
Australia, accountants are permitted to engage in all phases of

tax practice short of the regular court, as they have been per
mitted to do in the United States until recently.

Certified public accountants are qualified in tax
matters.

That being established, it would seem better to let

the public select what it wants and to let the matter work out

through the ordinary channels of competition. (Page 15, first
Incomplete paragraph)

If this proposition were acceptable to the legal
profession generally, it should not be difficult to provide CPAs
with reasonable security.
What objection could there be to the American Bar

Association joining with the Institute in asking the Treasury

Department to amend its regulation in Circular 230, leaving the

- 25 -

proviso in Section 10.2(f) untouched, but writing into the regu
lations an expression of what enrolled agents may do, consistent
with Dean Griswold’s "inner circle" theory, endorsement of the
Rocky Mountain Review article, and his answer to a question

Indicating that he believed certified public accountants may
properly Interpret and apply the provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code and related regulations and decisions.

This is the crux of the matter.

If state courts could

be effectively discouraged from holding CPAs to have engaged in the

practice of law merely because they interpret and apply provisions
of the Internal Revenue Code and related regulations and decisions

in the course of their ordinary tax practice, CPAs could breathe
easily and resume their normal cooperative relations with the legal
profession, which CPAs earnestly desire.
The Institute would then be only too glad to strengthen

its canons of ethics and to encourage its members to cooperate
with lawyers in all suitable circumstances.

In the present climate of insecurity and resentment,
cooperative relations between the two professions seem bound to
deteriorate.

